Reading Response: Kathleen Conzen et al., “The Invention of Ethnicity…”

September 15, 2016 Bradley FarlessLeave a comment

Kathleen Neils Conzen et al, “The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.”

In “The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.,” Conzen and her colleagues are attempting to construct a new conceptual framework for understanding ethnicity that builds off of the earlier work of Werner Sollors. Sollors believes that ethnicity is a “collective fiction” that is essentially invented. Conzen and her colleagues agree with Sollors that ethnicity is constructed, but not that it is complete fiction. Rather, they see ethnicity as a product of “communal solidarities, cultural attributes, and historical memories” (Conzen, et al., 4-5).

In order to prove their point, the authors use three case studies to demonstrate support for their theory that ethnicity is constantly reconstructed. The authors successfully show that there is nothing primordial, in the sense that they are unchangeable, about ethnicities. They are malleable and new expressions of ethnicity, at least in the American context as presented by the authors, are consistently reconstructed in reaction to external pressures or events. In doing so, Conzen and her colleagues demonstrate that expressions of ethnicity in the United States, while sometimes assuming symbols from their homelands, are uniquely American.

The authors also show that immigrant ethnicities have consistently emulated each other or presented their best imagined attributes in order to become respected in society. An interesting problem in the article, though not necessarily with the authors’ work, is that ethnic posturing of supposed positive contributions to society seems to have less to do with the successful integration into American society than the acquisition of wealth and political power does. This becomes apparent when the authors note that the Italian community was able to reposition itself in society, by demanding the establishment of Columbus Day as a Federal holiday and pressuring media outlets to stop referring to Italians as gangsters, only after they had become financially and politically powerful in American society (Conzen, et al., 31).

One of the most important contributions of Conzen and her colleagues’ article is the fact that they present the whole history of American society as being engaged in this process of constant ethnic redefinition. They show that after the revolution against Britain, an Anglo-Saxon Protestant identity was defined in order to maintain a functional society across States with different cultural and national backgrounds. This reinforces the authors’ point that ethnicity is built, fades and is rebuilt in order to meet peoples’ needs, not just by immigrants, but by the supposedly dominant cultural element in the country as well. There is no monolithic American culture that immigrants must emulate in order to become American. The authors show that ethnicities trade values and ideals and are constantly defining themselves and each other.

By complicated an overly simplistic narrative about ethnicities and assimilation into American society, the authors have opened the possibility for a more nuanced understanding of what it means to be an American. Viewing immigration and belonging in America through the lens of ethnic identities that are constantly being redefined clears away the mythology of a monolithic Anglo-Saxon super-ethnicity that immigrant ethnic groups must join. We are left with new questions, as well. Are there essential qualities or ideals that one must subscribe to in order to be American, or is what it means to be American a constantly shifting definition? Another avenue that could be explored using the concept of ethnicity presented by the authors is the fluidity, or lack thereof, of traveling between ethnic groups. This is touched on by the authors, but they focus their analysis on the behavior of ethnic groups as a whole, rather than the transition of a person from one group to another.

The Other Within: Can Muslims Be French?

March 24, 2016 Bradley FarlessLeave a comment

Whether or not Muslims can be accepted into European countries as more than just itinerant travelers, whether that is possible or even desirable, is a question that has been addressed by scholars, “talking heads,” politicians, and average citizens the world over. The situation of Muslims in European countries is difficult to generalize, because each country has its own specific set of circumstances that led to the addition of immigrant populations. However, this paper will analyze how Muslims have been presented in Europe generally and then focus more narrowly on the specific context of France, which has Europe’s largest Muslim population. This paper will cover Europeans’ conception of what Europe is, what an authentic European is, and the role that Islam plays in creating that image.

Additionally, I will argue that Muslims in Europe, and specifically in France, have been subjected to a type of criticism that implies that Muslims are a homogenous and mutually responsible group that is inherently violent, with Muslims in France being held to a standard that is unachievable in terms of becoming truly French. I will argue that Muslims in France are already French, addressing their issues from a position of wanting their rights to be observed, rather than requesting rights in the sense of the American Civil Rights movement. Additionally, I will argue that France’s particular system of government and conception of laïcité (a type of secularism) precludes the successful integration of minorities.

In a book section titled “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?” written in 2002, Talal Asad analyzes the way that Europeans have traditionally understood Europe and what it means to be European in order to understand whether or not minorities can be successfully integrated. Asad belives that the modern discourse on European identity is concerned with exclusions and anxieties about non-Europeans and contains an implicit demand that the rest of the world recognize Europe based on its self-proclaimed identity.[1] In a sense, Europe is creating propaganda in order to shape world opinion about Europe’s role in world society. Asad begins his analysis by tracing the historical development of the concept of Europe to the Middle Ages, where Europe and Christendom were synonymous terms, often used in contradistinction to the Ottoman Empire, which was Islamic.

The idea of what Europe was, and is, inherently tied to religion and remains that way today, regardless of the new ascribed secular nature of states.[2] Asad develops this idea by noting that Balkan states who have populations that are indistinguishable from other white Europeans, that have secular political institutions and are geographically within Europe are still somehow not European. They can be in Europe, but not of Europe.[3]

Asad also introduces the idea of European civilization, which is based on the idea of a shared history that includes the Roman Empire, Christianity (as noted above), the Enlightenment, and industrialization.[4] The fact that Muslim immigrants have not shared in these experiences are what Asad believes creates a sense of Muslims not belonging in European society. This also disconnects the idea of Europe from a geographic space, explaining how it is possible to be in Europe but not to be of Europe. In other words, there is something essential to being European, but becoming fully European would require one to shed his or her own essential identity and replace it with a European one. If something is essential to one’s self, it is a defining factor in one’s identity. Can it be removed?

Asad builds on this understanding of essential qualities to argue that because assimilation requires the forfeiture of one’s self and the assumption of European identity, there is no place for minorities in Europe. An interesting quote found in Constructing Muslims in France: Discourse, Public Identity, and the Politics of Citizenship greatly illuminates this problem of secularism and personal identity. In her discussion on Muslim identity in France, the author, Jennifer Fredette, argues that “Karl Marx would tell us that pretending it is possible to separate the public from the private so neatly is secularism’s greatest conceit.”[5] Fredette is placing Muslim identity in Europe in perspective by first exploring the underpinnings of the modern conception of citizenship. She argues that it is impossible to separate the personal from the public, which agrees with Asad’s assessment of essential characteristics of people.[6]

What we are meant to understand from this is that one’s private beliefs and private nature influence our public behavior and the way we are perceived by others. In a secular state, there will still be some influence from privately held beliefs. This becomes important when one tries to understand why Muslims are considered unassimilable into European, and specifically French, societies. Secular, modern conceptions of citizenship in France are predicated on possessing a French passport and having some cultural attachment to the country, such as speaking French. The majority of Muslims in France, at this point, have never lived in another country. They were born in France, speak French as a first or only language, and have to search generations back into their ancestry to find a connection to immigration.[7] Some Muslims are converts and have no link to immigration, yet there is something about them nonetheless that causes them to be outside of the scope of French society. The qualifier has shifted from secular understandings of citizenship to personal beliefs, creating the idea of deserving and undeserving citizens.

Fredette situates her argument not in terms of whether Muslims can become French, but instead looks at why this question is being asked, how it affects Muslims in France and how they respond.[8] Fredette finds that most Muslims in France are, in their own understanding of themselves, integrated into French society. They identify as French and are capable of using the French political system, speaking French, and navigating French society. French Muslims’ complaints are not about receiving rights, in the sense of African Americans during the Civil Rights campaign, but rather are about having their rights respected. This is a nuanced but important difference. Muslims are demanding neutrality in law, in the sense of not having Islam be the focusing issue of political debates involving immigrants and descendants of immigrants. Muslims also demand recognition of the social abuses they suffer.[9]

Social abuses can elevate to an accepted discourse that becomes prevalent in society and creates a feeling of second-class citizenship. For example, a Muslim woman’s employer refers to all Muslim women as Fatima. Or, a Muslim woman helps an ethnically French woman lift her pram onto a bus and the bus driver closes the door on her, almost crushing the baby in the process, in order to slight her.[10] Fredette is drawing a distinction between integration and assimilation, as well as between political and social integration. She argues that it is possible to be integrated into a country politically and theoretically have equal protection under the law, but to be socially excluded based on personal beliefs in such a way that it undermines the conception of citizenship, leading to the previously mentioned discourse on deserving and undeserving citizens.[11] Fredette’s understanding of assimilation without integration builds on that presented by Sharif Gemie in French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France, where she defines integration as comprehending the manner in which society works, or the acquisition of that competence. She argues that this understanding avoids the ideological fog of ambiguous ideas revolving around values like “fair play,” “toleration,” “motherhood,” and “apple pie.”[12]

Understanding the way that discourse is produced and shaped in France is essential to understanding why Muslims feel socially marginalized. Fredette identifies three major groups as being responsible for producing and maintaining popular discourse in France: politicians, the media, and intellectuals, which she collectively refers to as the French elite. She argues that discourse production in France is unusually unified in that these groups of people are all from the same social strata, attend the same schools and share ideas with one another, creating a unified bloc of information producers.[13] The media are arguably the most important of these discourse producers, given their role in shaping and transmitting the messages of the other two groups to the public.

According to Fredette, today’s modern, elite conception of what it means to be a deserving French citizen involves the possession of five unique traits: complete liberality in sexual relations, refraining from references to religion in public and social affairs, an aversion to cultural pluralism (implying being strictly French in the full sense with no hyphenated identity), adhering to a theory of abstract individualism, and having an ancestral origin that is within the accepted boundaries of Europe.[14] This understanding of Frenchness is antithetical to minorities in general and Muslims in particular. There is no room for difference in this definition of being French. Because Catholicism is so ingrained in French culture, adherence to Islam in any shape or form is seen as cultural pluralism. Religiosity usually involves sexual restraint, which also infringes on the popular elite perception of fraternity, which has become inseparable from a notion of mixing of the sexes.[15]

Understanding the elite discourse on Muslims is important in understanding why they are thought to be unassimilable. In line with Talal Asad’s presentation of Muslims as existing outside of European civilization, the media has traditionally depicted Muslims as others, following a general pattern over time that shifted from a sensual, sexualized depiction of Muslims to one of Muslim fanaticism. In an article titled, “Comparative Analysis of Mainstream Discourses, Media Narratives and Representations of Islam in Britain and France Prior to 9/11,” Malcom Brown shows that while there was an academically accepted paradigm shift centered on the events of September 11, 2001, there has always been a wide variety of media presentations of Muslims.[16] Tellingly, however, these media presentations have always shown Muslims as “others”, outside of French society.

Brown notes that despite France’s close proximity to Muslim societies, which would lead one to expect a degree of familiarity that would prevent Muslims from being portrayed as exotic, media representations tended to follow this stereotype well into the 1970s. This was presented in two ways: a portrayed exoticism of the senses and a need to explain the “strangeness” of Muslim culture.[17] During the 1970s and into the 1980s, the common discourse on Muslims in French media highlighted ethnicity and nationality, rather than religion, though Brown notes that a shift towards depictions of fanaticism was underway as a result of the 1973 Oil Crisis.[18]

Brown notes that there is a tendency towards reactionary reporting in the French media. When crimes occur that involve Muslims (and presumably other minorities), the articles produced by the media not only report the event, but take on airs of superiority that place these minorities on a lower run of the civilizational order, or in other words, outside of French society. An example is when a girl was made to swallow several litres of salt water as a supposed Islamic home remedy for epilepsy, causing her death. The event was reported as “causing death by torture and barbaric acts.”[19] The event might have been interpreted and reported very differently if it had been a death caused by a French home remedy. The perpetrators were also accused of multiculturalism, calling into question their Frenchness.

By 1989, media depictions of Muslims in France had shifted and began to associate Muslims with fanaticism. An example is a Le Nouvel Observateur article that juxtaposed an image of Khomeini’s funeral in Iran with the establishment of “Islamist” groups in France.[20] The formation of Islamic groups in France was questioned because they received support from foreign countries, again calling into question the national loyalties and Frenchness of the Muslims who benefited from these institutions. By the early 1990s, French media was emphasizing problems of “integration” of Muslims, linking these problems with “fanaticism” and “fundamentalism.” Muslims began to complain that they were represented in French media by an “Islamalgame” of “terrorist, Islamist, Muslim, North African, Arab and immigrant.”[21] Brown does not fully explain the reasoning behind why this shift occurred, but according to John Bowen, there was a spillover of violence from the civil war in Algeria during this time period.[22] As a result, Muslims’ Frenchness was again called into question.

Another issue that Muslims had to deal with was their status as residents of the banlieues, neighborhoods constructed in isolation by the French government. These neighborhoods were filled with immigrant, mostly Muslim and Arab residents, who had poor employment opportunities because of unequal access to education. Combined with a universal slump in the French economy after the boom years following World War II, they became centers of poverty, drugs, crime and violence. This situation was used to attribute blanket accusations that associated all Muslims with violence, drug dealing, racism, gender violence, and delinquency (unemployment), despite the fact that similar situations, especially of gender violence, were prevalent in other parts of France.[23] It is interesting to note that these accusations are extremely similar to current media debates about the status of African American neighborhoods in the United States, meaning that the problems presented by these neighborhoods are not inherent qualities of the residents. However, French media began to present these problems as universal. Journalists were sent out to gather sensationalist stories that exacerbated the negative image of Muslims in the media.[24]

The exceptional poverty that exists in these neighborhoods, combined with the social exclusion of Muslims mentioned by Fredette, created barriers to successful integration in French society. Moreover, the situation intensified feelings of isolation and oppression that led to riots in October and November of 2005. Rather than the media and, by extension, the rest of the French insular elite recognizing and acknowledging the real problems faced by Muslims in these neighborhoods, references were made to Muslims’ failure to integrate into society, as if the socioeconomic positions they were born into was wholly their fault. Instead, Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior and later president, commented that he would wipe use a high-pressure hose to wipe the scum off the streets, causing even greater rioting and violence.[25]

Another significant way that Muslims have been depicted in the media which is related to the violence in the banlieues is as a security threat. One example of this viewpoint is that of Robert S. Leiken, which he presents in his article, “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” Using a wider interpretive lens like Talal Asad, Leiken analyzes the presence of Muslims in all European countries from the perspective of international security. Specifically, he is thinking of the border security of the United States and how allowing Muslims to live in Europe creates security risks because of the laxity of travel restrictions both within the European Union and between the European Union and the United States.

A look at Leiken’s analysis in detail is useful, in terms of helping one to understand the way that Muslims are thought of in relation to their status as residents of Europe. Additionally, this places the prevailing French media narrative in a larger context. According to Leiken, the laxity of some member states’ asylum laws allow Islamic radicals to enter the European Union, providing the catalyst for radicalization. Leiken’s argument portrays Muslims in a specific way, as a security threat that must be contained. His writing contains distortions and stretches meant to make the threat seem more plausible and imminent, playing to a discourse on Muslims that has become mainstream and widely accepted. His writing portrays Muslims as an intrinsic security threat who by their very nature cannot be part of the European community or Western “civilization.”

Another problem with Leiken’s analysis is his use of a Mecca vs. Medina analogy which, while illustrative, is historically incorrect and misrepresents the foundational period of Islamic history, which is significant in terms of his topic. In his analogy, he states that Mohammed “pronounced an anathema on [Mecca’s] leaders and took his followers to Medina … [where] he built an army that conquered Mecca in AD 630…”[26] Mohammed fled Mecca in the face of persecution and by all accounts was among the last to leave, having first sent a group of followers to Ethiopia and then having sent the remainder to Medina ahead of himself. In Medina, he did not “[build] and army”, he built a community and engaged in the common raiding practices of the Arabian Peninsula.[27] He also built political alliances which were useful when hostilities did break out.

Leiken’s misrepresentation of the situation and glossing over of the long hostilities, political treaties and eventual surrender of Mecca to Mohammed’s men oversimplifies a complicated process in a way that depicts Muslims as naturally violent from the beginning of their history, leading to the teleological conclusion that they must be dealt with in some way to make Europe and the United States safe from their supposed barbarism. This supposed innate violence is evident in the willingness of media to use blanket accusations against Muslims, as evidenced by the earlier complaint of being represented in the French media by an “Islamalgame”, and by the way that social issues in the banleiues are addressed. Leiken’s inability or unwillingness to approach the situation of Muslim minorities in Europe from a realistic position that sees Muslims as people, rather than as potential threats, is not unusual. It fits into a larger trend of using rhetoric rather complicated narratives to explain the situation of Muslims in France.

This trend is oddly not restricted to ethnic French people. There are cases where Muslims have built their careers around rejecting and denouncing Islam in the French media. One example is that of Chahdortt Djavann, a naturalized French citizen from Iran. She is very vocal about her hatred of Islam and writes extensively on her feelings of alienation, betrayal, and feelings of sexual repression based on veiling. For Djavann, there is no possibility of multiculturalism; one must either be French or Muslim.[28] Sharif Gemie refers to her polemics as simplistic, especially in comparison to the French literary giants that Djavann idolizes, and essentially accuses her of selling out to live the life she dreamed of: one of freedom and wealth. Gemie says that Djavann plays her part well, telling “nationalist-minded neo-republicans exactly what they want to hear. She tells them that France is right, and that it is morally and politically better than other countries.”[29]

One thing that Djavann’s choice should make clear, however, is that acceptance into French society as being truly French is absolutely predicated on a complete rejection of Islam, being Muslim, and being culturally and sexually different from the mainstream. French secularism is not about freedom of choice, at least not for Muslims. It is instead about conformity. Talal Asad, though addressing Europe as a whole in terms of democracies and Muslim minorities, would likely agree, because it fits the same model. Where Asad observed that there is no place for a minority voice in a democracy, there is no place for a minority group to find a voice within French society. To be French one must become an abstract part of the whole, subsuming oneself into another identity. Personally, this emphasis on creating a society full of identical abstract people comes across as incredibly dangerous to the mental health of a population. It subsumes individuality into a collective whole, and attempts to render the “self” meaningless.

The issue of Muslims in France and whether or not they can integrate is, like Fredette stated, the wrong way to approach the situation. Muslims in France are French Muslims. Their situations are not uniquely religious or unique to their social groups. They are issues that affect all Muslims in France, but because of their status as immigrants, they are seen as unique in all things. They are uniquely different, uniquely other, uniquely in need of being “civilized” and assimilated. The issues that are inherent to the Muslim condition in France are exacerbated by the media’s portrayal of them as being inherently violent and foreign. Their assessment as a security threat only serves to further isolate them. The elite discourse that demands that all French people be exactly the same is unproductive and unrealistic, and creates unachievable expectations for Muslims in French society, especially considering that there are many accepted French people who do not meet the five signifiers of being French. As the French republic currently exists, as the current definition of laïcité stands, it is not possible for Muslims to become part of France because there would be no such thing as a French Muslim. One would have to stop being Muslim to be French.

Footnotes

[1] Talal Asad, “”Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?” in Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, edited by Anthony Pagden (West Nyack: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 211.

[2] Ibid., 212-213.

[3] Ibid., 213.

[4] Ibid., 214.

[5] Jennifer Fredette, Constructing Muslims in France: Discourse, Public Identity, and the Politics of Citizenship (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014), 53.

[6] Ibid., 52-53.

[7] Ibid., 39-40.

[8] Ibid., 21.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., 21, 23 & Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010), 73.

[11] Jennifer Fredette, Constructing Muslims in France: Discourse, Public Identity, and the Politics of Citizenship (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014), 21.

[12] Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010), 44.

[13] Ibid., 32-33.

[14] Ibid., 54.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Malcolm D. Brown, “Comparative Analysis of Mainstream Discourses, Media Narratives and Representations of Islam in Britain and France Prior to 9/11,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 26.3 (December, 2006): 297-298.

[17] Ibid., 299.

[18] Ibid., 300.

[19] Ibid., 301.

[20] Ibid., 303.

[21] Ibid., 304.

[22] John R. Bowen, “Recognizing Islam in France after 9/11,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35.3 (March, 2009): 439.

[23] Ibid., & Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010),78-79.

[24] Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010), 70.

[25] Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010), 74.

[26] Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs 84.4 (July-August, 2005): 127.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Sharif Gemie, French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010), 49.

[29] Ibid., 62.

References

Asad, Talal. 2002. “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Reprsent Islam?” Chap. 10 in Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union, edited by Anthony Pagden, 209-227. West Nyack, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Bowen, John R. 2009. “Recognising Islam in France after 9/11.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, March: 439-452.

Brown, Malcolm D. 2006. “Comparative Analysis of Mainstream Discourses, Media Narratives and Representations of Islam in Britain and France Prior to 9/11.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, December: 297-312.

Fredette, Jennifer. 2014. Constructing Muslims in France: Discourse, Public Identity, and the Politics of Citizenship. Philadelphia: Temple University.

Gemie, Sharif. 2010. French Muslims: New Voices in Contemporary France. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Leiken, Robert S. 2005. “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” Foreign Affairs, Jul-Aug: 120-135.

“Europe’s Angry Muslims” (2005), by Robert S. Leiken – Response Essay

March 3, 2016 Bradley FarlessLeave a comment

In “Europe’s Angry Muslims” (2005), Robert S. Leiken analyzes the presence of Muslims in European countries from the perspective of international security, or specifically the security of the United States, which has visa-waiver agreements with the European Union. According to his article, Muslims are able to easily enter the European Union due to lax rules regarding who is allowed in. Islamic radicals are allowed to enter one European country and, because of the lack of border controls between European Union members, they are then able to travel to all European countries in the EU. Besides the risk to the European Union member states, Leiken sees this as a problem because these radicals are recruiting jihadis who are second generation immigrants and have European citizenship, allowing them to freely travel to the United States.

Leiken’s article emphasizes the role that being a minority in Europe plays in enabling the radicalization of Muslims. Across different contexts, Leiken finds a common thread of estrangement from the dominant culture that turns into disillusionment and anger in Muslims who are born in Europe and have European citizenship, but are socially excluded based on their ethnic and religious backgrounds.

Leiken’s use of statistics to demonstrate the threat of Europe-born Muslim jihadis is flawed. He states that the number of mujahideen who identified as European nationals in North America and Europe in a 1993-2004 survey was roughly 25% of the total, representing the largest demographic within the group. What does that prove, really? It would stand to reason that there would be more local-born Muslims than immigrants in a given time period. This does not, however, call into question the seriousness of the problem of radicalization of domestic Muslims.

Another problem with Leiken’s analysis is his Mecca vs. Medina analogy which, while illustrative, is historically incorrect and misrepresents the foundational period of Islamic history which is significant in terms of his topic: conflict between Muslims and Westerners. In his analogy, he states that Mohammed “pronounced an anathema on [Mecca’s] leaders and took his followers to Medina … [where] he built an army that conquered Mecca in AD 630…” (127). Mohammed fled Mecca in the face of persecution, and by all accounts was among the last to leave, having first sent a group of followers to Ethiopia and then having sent the remainder to Medina ahead of himself. In Medina, he did not “[build] and army” (127), he built a community and engaged in the common raiding practices of the Arabian Peninsula. He also built political alliances which were useful when hostilities did break out. Leiken’s misrepresentation of the situation and glossing over of the long hostilities, political treaties and eventual surrender of Mecca to Mohammed’s men paints Muslims as naturally violent from the beginning of their history, leading to the teleological conclusion that they must be dealt with in some way to make Europe and the United States safe from their barbarism.

Leiken discusses the ways that European countries have engaged with their Muslim populations, noting that all attempts to integrate them have failed, from Belgium’s active attempts to socially support and integrate all comers to Germany’s separation to Britain’s multiculturalism. He then herald’s the United States’ as being the most successful with a policy of toleration while allowing the maintenance of social distinctions. He does not describe how the policy in the US is really that different from the policies of Britain. What Leiken does do, however, is discuss boundaries created by geography that prevent the type of radicalism spreading throughout Europe from reaching the United States. He notes that Muslims in Europe can see radical speeches on satellite and the Internet, but fails to note that those same mediums are available in the United States. By claiming logistical difficulties, Leiken gives too little credit to terrorist organizations and too much credit to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in preventing terrorism.

The conflict between Muslims and Westerners is sometimes framed as a battle of civilizations, with the implication being that one must wipe out the other to survive. Leiken’s analysis posits Muslim minorities as unassimilable, even in the best case scenario of the United States, where they are “tolerated” but socially distinct (133). This, combined with Leiken’s presentation of Muslims as historically and uniquely violent through a distorted retelling of the religion’s foundational history perpetuates the notion that they are outside of Europe and cannot be brought inside; they must be contained because they cannot be European.

Policing Paris: The origins of modern immigration… – Reaction Essay

February 18, 2016 Bradley FarlessLeave a comment

In Policing Paris: The origins of modern immigration control between the wars, Clifford Rosenberg looks at the creation of a complex policing apparatus in Paris and how this institution helped to define the roles of citizenship and nationality in the French public’s mind. He does this by analyzing the context in which the institution was created and how social controls were adapted to changing ideas of who belonged and who was a foreigner.

Rosenberg’s book opens up questions about the nature of belonging to a state. There is an assumption that there is something intrinsic to belonging to a state. France was historically defined as being a nation state constituted by and from the French nation, but Rosenberg’s work calls into question the very Frenchness of the state. He lists the numbers of immigrants that arrived in France from various countries, mostly European but also some Asians and North Africans. If all of these people became French, then what is “French”? Why were certain groups, like the Russians, assumed to be capable of assimilating into the society while others were not? One politician quoted by Rosenberg says that being French is not a matter of blood, but rather one of education, so why were North Africans considered unable to be educated? It seems that targeted surveillance of North Africans had more to do with the need to keep them subjugated to the French state than it had to do with security.

An idea that features prominently in Rosenberg’s work is Foucault’s theory of “governmentality” as a form of violence by the state against a population. Rosenberg spends much of the first half of the book praising the card catalogues and indexing systems created by the French to monitor population subsets and showing that they were models that were emulated by the rest of the world. It is unclear whether or not Rosenberg subscribes to Foucault’s theory. He both criticizes the use of surveillance against specific groups (the North Africans) and also praises the ability of these identification systems to allow for the creation of welfare systems. Rosenberg probably has socialist leanings, which influenced his analysis. However, his work does raise the question of whether or not identification systems are useful, or even good. Should the state know everything about everyone? Are the benefits of social welfare programs worth the cost of giving up one’s identity to the state?

Rosenberg shows that prior to modern immigration control, borders were much more fluid. Attaining what we think of as citizenship today was much easier and the flow of people around the world followed a much more natural process of migrating to areas where labor was needed, contrary to the assumption that rural residents were tied to the land. The changing nature of the labor market seems to have had the biggest impact on how and why states control the flow of people. Rosenberg emphasizes this by showing that immigration control was initially meant to protect the domestic French labor market from foreign competition that entered French territory. With the state of the world today, including outsourcing and a global economy, it calls into question the necessity or relevance of borders, which greatly illuminates modern debate surrounding illegal immigration into the United States from South America.

While not conclusively taking a stance on the rightness or morality of modern identification systems, Rosenberg opens up many question about citizenship, nationality and what it means to belong to a sovereign political body. He uses the Paris specifically and France generally to illustrate how the idea of borders and belonging have changed over time, making it easier to understand the nature of labor migration and the process of naturalization, as well as shedding light on why current debates call into question the very nature of political borders.

Use it til it Breaks

April 7, 2015 Bradley FarlessLeave a comment

I went up to 181st Street today to drop off a return at UPS. A book I ordered from Amazon didn’t arrive in time so I had no use for it and figured I might as well get my money back. I love Amazon’s return policies. The refund was processed as soon as the item was scanned in by UPS.

While I was walking down the street, I overheard a conversation between a girl and her mother. We were standing near each other on a corner while waiting for the light to change. The mother was telling her daughter that she was going to get her a new phone in heavily accented English. The daughter, who spoke English without an accent, told her mother that the phone she has works fine and she doesn’t need a new one. This escalated almost into an argument with the daughter telling her mother that her phone works just fine and she’s going to use it until it’s broken before she gets a new one, because she doesn’t see the point of replacing something that still works.

I had a few thoughts about this. Was the mother a first generation immigrant and the daughter born here? Is it a conflict of identity? What I mean is, does the mother see herself as being American through participation in consumer culture while the daughter doesn’t feel the need to? Is it a result of first generation immigrants trying to accumulate material wealth as a response to a previous life of (by US standards) deprivation? Maybe the daughter is more concerned with the planet or the ecosystem and the mother doesn’t understand or care about those things. Or maybe the mother just really wanted to get something nice for the girl and doesn’t know what else to buy her.

Anyway, I’m glad it’s getting warmer again. This winter was like a long period of hibernation. I’m looking forward to going out and exploring the city again.

Response: Cem Behar’s “A Neighborhood in Ottoman Istanbul: Fruit Vendors and Civil Servants in Kasap Ilyas Mahalle”

March 19, 2013 Bradley FarlessLeave a comment

In A Neighborhood in Ottoman Istanbul: Fruit Vendors and Civil Servants in Kasap Ilyas Mahalle, Cem Behar attempts to reconstruct the life of an Ottoman Istanbul neighborhood through the use of an exceptional collection of records that he claims are unique to Kasap Ilyas. The records he uses as a primary source for his reconstruction of the mahalle are the notebooks and records of the neighborhood’s imam and (later the) muhtar, which he supplements with data from the 1885 and 1907 censuses and Islamic court records from 1782 to 1924. Additionally, the author attempts to recreate the atmosphere of the neighborhood in the late Ottoman, early Republic period, by interviewing elderly residents of the modern neighborhood.

When considering the information used to create this account, one has to wonder how representative of Istanbul life in general it can possibly be. Behar is careful to point out that Kasap Ilyas’s history and circumstances are certainly unique, and while his findings cannot be used to generalize about Istanbul life, it can be used as a tool to essentially guess at what life in other parts of the city might have been like, given similar circumstances. How many other neighborhoods were there that could have replicated the situation in Kasap Ilyas, however? It does seem to have had many peculiarities, including the large public bath, the nearby wharf, and later the influx of a large population of immigrants from Arapkir. Certainly other parts of Istanbul must have had immigrant populations who were incorporated into society in a similar manner (claims of lost identity papers glossed over by local sponsorship), but how many other neighborhoods also had access to a wharf and warehouses, or to large gardens that provided work opportunities and properly accommodated a working class population? Certainly the elderly inhabitants of the modern neighborhood felt that there was something unique about their neighborhood when they bitterly complained about the destruction of the warehouses and the ‘upper mahalle’ as destroying something essential to their neighborhood.

The unique combination of people and resources (the wharf, gardens, and bath) created a sustainable neighborhood in a city where neighborhoods were routinely absorbed into neighboring mahalles. What I found most interesting about the structure of the neighborhoods, however, is both the diversity of economic classes and the living arrangements. Coming from a Western society, I took for granted that the division of neighborhoods by economic class was a universal occurrence. What factors influenced social norms in Istanbul that made it ok to live in socioeconomically diverse neighborhoods, with beggars living right next to mansions? What made Western society so different? Behar mentions that socioeconomic divisions of neighborhoods didn’t occur until the twentieth century, in response to Western influence. Was it really just as simple as people from similar ethnic and religious groups living together, as a priority over people of similar economic classes living together? Was this common in Islamic cities, or just Ottoman cities, or just in Anatolia? Regarding living arrangements, it was interesting to see that people would often list their business as their residence, but that speaks directly to the economic situation in the neighborhood.

Behar used the itinerant vending of fresh fruits as an example of an informal trade network and then used it to describe the difference between the common activities of recent immigrants from Arapkir to Kasap Ilyas and the more established Istanbulites who had stable businesses governed by regulations and guild organizations. He described an informal network as requiring little or no skill, no permit or license, and little to no startup costs. The only true requirement is that one have a customer base, which Behar describes as a “solid network of personal relations” (115). Behar’s point was probably to show what factors made Kasap Ilyas such an attractive point of entry to Istanbul for the Arapkir immigrants. The Arapkirlis had previously established a system of patronage through the retinue of a pasha who brought his household back to Kasap Ilyas. Alone, this would not have been enough, but because of the presence of the large vegetable gardens, like the Langa gardens, the Arapkirlis were able to incorporate themselves into the larger Istanbul economy through “entry-level” work. Certainly many maintained that lifestyle. Behar describes fathers and sons performing this work together, but Behar also describes other Arapkirlis using fruit vending as a starting point for upward mobility through civil service. I’m sure that there are many cities in many parts of the world that have experienced similar patterns of immigrant exploitation of a resource to establish an ethnically homogenous presence in a city where greater opportunities for social mobility are present. Considering the high rate of population turnover in the neighborhood, it is likely that not only the Arapkirlis were taking advantage of the neighborhood’s usefulness as a socioeconomic stepping stone.

One area of Behar’s work that I found problematic was his assumption of familiarity with foreign language terms. Of course, when writing this type of history, it would be fair to assume that the reader has some familiarity with ‘Islamic’ terms, but Behar’s text is liberally sprinkled with Latin phrases and words that have been borrowed from German. He places these phrases in Italics, signaling their rare usage, but then fails to give a definition. Admittedly, a reader could simply pick up a dictionary to learn the meaning on his own, but if Behar knew the usage of those phrases was problematic and put them in italics, he could have gone the extra mile and defined them at their first usage as well. There were also instances where he deliberately used a Latin word where an English word would have sufficed, like on page 40 where he uses nomenklatura instead of “nomenclature”. Given the context, it is unclear whether he is using the Latin term to replace the English term or if he is making a reference to different statuses within the elite classes of Communist bureaucracies. Another problematic use of language is on page 90, where Behar indicates that the ‘surname’ “binti Abdullah” is significant in connoting conversion to Islam, but does not explain why.

Overall, Cem Behar’s work does an outstanding job of using records to create an image of what Kasap Ilyas might have looked like over the course of Ottoman control of Istanbul. It helps the reader to understand the social and economic dynamics at play in the neighborhood and the city in general, as well as how neighborhoods operated internally.

Guatemalan Woman Attempts to Secure US Anchor Baby for Immigration

February 2, 2012 Bradley Farless14 Comments

I just saw a report on ABC about a woman who claims that the US government stole her child. She entered the country illegally, which is a felony and an insult to the national sovereignty of this country, and when she was caught, she was deemed to be an unfit mother for smuggling her child across international boundaries. In his 2008 decision, terminating Encarnacion’s parental rights, Circuit Court Judge David C. Dally wrote that the biological mother’s “lifestyle, that of smuggling herself into a country illegally and committing crimes in this country is not a lifestyle that can provide stability for a child…A child cannot be educated in this way, always in hiding or on the run.”

Her son was taken away from her and has been adopted out to a family that has had him for 5 years. Now this illegal immigrant, Encarnacion Bail Romero, is trying to get her son back. She’s trying to play the ‘broken family’ card to get sympathy from the American public. She’s trying to get us to overlook the fact that she’s a convicted felon who disregarded the sovereignty of our nation by ignoring our legal immigration procedures. She wants to use our own court system against us.

This excerpt from the article sums up my opinion fairly well:

“When parents break the law, they undertake a certain amount of risk that there are going to be consequences,” said Daniel Stein of FAIR, the Federation for American Immigration Reform.

“Anyone can feel for the torment that this poor woman is going through, recognizing that she doesn’t have the educational and the language capabilities to fully defend and vindicate her rights,” said Stein.

“Nevertheless, she knew she came to this country illegally, she knew she broke the law,” he told ABC News.

This illegal immigrant will get no sympathy from me. If she didn’t want her family to be broken, she shouldn’t have broken federal laws. We have borders for a reason. We have immigration procedures for a reason. It’s too late. The ship has already sailed. If this kid (formerly called Carlos and now named Jamison) has been adopted out and with a new family for 5 years, she should let the boy enjoy his life, because she would be a stranger to him. What she wants to do would totally destroy this kid’s life, because he would be emotionally scarred forever. I can’t imagine why she would imagine that fighting for custody of the kid would be in his best interest, since he doesn’t even know her and doesn’t speak Spanish (the biological mother speaks no English), unless of course she’s looking for an anchor that she can use to stay in the United States herself.

Original Story on ABC: “Adoption Battle Over 5-Year Old Boy Pits Missouri Couple Vs. Illegal Immigrant“

Culture Clash: Small-Town American vs. Somalian Immigrant Culture

April 4, 2011 Bradley Farless7 Comments

This is a paper I wrote for my 100 level Anthropology class. It deals primarily with an incident that occurred in Lewiston, Maine, between the residents and a massive influx of Muslim Somali immigrant refugees, and the reactions of both sides. The paper was written along specific guidelines, as well as from an anthropological and cultural perspective. The purpose of the paper is not to debate whether or not it was ‘right’ for the Somalis to be in the town, or to have been admitted to the country. It was, instead, to discuss how culture affects relations between people from different areas, what cultural concepts are being demonstrated, and possible accommodations or solutions that could be offered.

The specific guidelines for the essay are as follows:

1. Review the video on migration above. [Migration: A Profile of the US]

2. Read article “Mixed Welcome…” … and

3. Answer the following questions in your paper:

Explain how aspects like migration, religion, food, dress, language, & religious holidays are cultural.

How are these cultural elements different in Somali culture than they are in small-town American culture?

What is important to know about these cultural elements, as they apply to Somali culture?

What do the Somali immigrants and the local Lewiston residents probably have in common?

What could local American government institutions, schools, and residents do to make accommodations for—and be sensitive toward—the cross-cultural differences?

How does this experience of cross-cultural contact illustrate what we’ve learned about cultural knowledge, individual behavior, and the process of cultural change?

Additionally, the paper was to be written in APA style (which I hope I got right) with at least 5 different references for material covered in the course to date. I’ve included the references at the end of the post, so that the in-text citations make sense, and so a potential reader can find more information or verify the information I’ve presented in case they’re doing their own research for a paper. I’ve also added some images to make this long stretch of text a bit more visually appealing.

Please keep in mind that this paper was written based only on the information given, rather than on any more recent events in Lewiston.

If you have any questions about the paper, please feel free to contact me or leave a comment.

Culture Clash: Small-Town American vs. Somalian Immigrant Culture

America is a great melting pot of cultures, but sometimes, cultures don’t want to be melted. To be more specific, there are sometimes groups of people who immigrate to the United States, but don’t want to assimilate into American culture. They bring their culture with them and then create isolated pockets of their own cultures within the greater American society. This isn’t an issue that only comes from immigrants. There are groups in the United States who have been here for generations that we all accept, like the Amish, who do not embrace modern American culture. Perhaps the reason we don’t mind having these insular groups in the United States is because they are, in fact, insular. They don’t try to impose their beliefs on the established order. In the case of the Amish, many of the beliefs and practices are still similar enough to our own that we can, if not accept them, understand them.

Problems arise when two very different cultures attempt to interact with each without trying to understand or make accommodation for each other first. Each group makes demands of the other group, oftentimes without being willing to compromise in any way. This paper will be discussing the ways in which culture and the misunderstanding of it have led to culture clashes between Somali immigrants in Lewiston, Maine and the local, small-town American population already living there (Belluck, 2002).

What is Culture?

Before trying to understand how cultural differences have led to misunderstandings between immigrant populations and the local, receiving populations, it will be helpful to understand just what culture is. The popular idea of culture is that it’s a desirable trait you can somehow acquire by attending a certain number of plays, visiting art galleries, or by going to classy concerts (Ember, Ember, & Peregrine, 2010). The reality is that culture is a difficult concept to nail down (Townsend, 2011) and an exact definition has been debated by anthropologists, with entire books being dedicated to the subject (White J. J., May/June 1998). The earliest definition of culture stated that it is “[t]hat complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (White E. B., 1871). This is a very inclusive definition, which leads you to believe that almost every aspect of daily life is cultural, and it is. Waking up in the morning and having a cup of coffee is cultural. Using an alarm clock to get out of bed at a set time is cultural. Driving your car to work every day is cultural. Going to church on Sunday is also cultural. Culture is everything we’ve been trained to do by the external sources that surround us (parents, television, education, radio, etc.), that allow us to function as well-integrated members of our societies.

So then, what is a society? And how do we define what cultural traits belongs to a society? A society is (Ember et al., 2010) “a group of people who occupy a particular territory and speak a common language not generally understood by neighboring peoples” (p. 224). These territories may or may not correspond to existing countries, which is the case with the Somali, who have populations in Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia (Shurgin, 2006). For a behavior to be considered a cultural trait of a particular society it must be a widely held belief or practice that is commonly found amongst the population (Ember et al., 2010). Using this information, it can readily be accepted that aspects of a society that are shared and practiced by the majority of a people are elements of that society’s distinct culture. This can include their choice of clothing, the types of food they eat, their language(s), holidays, and even beliefs. In regards to the Somali in Lewiston, even their migration can be seen as a result of culture. “Push and pull” (Migration: A Profile of the US, 2009) cultural factors in the country being emigrated from and the receiving country can act as powerful motivators to cause a migration. For example, the climate of war and conflict in Somalia, caused by the cultural tradition of clan loyalty is a strong push factor for emigration, whereas the relatively open, accepting, and peaceful society within the United States (caused by our culturally derived judicial and governmental systems) can be a strong pull factor, making it a desirable destination for immigrants.

So, culture is a powerful influence that affects almost every aspect of our lives. We grow up believing that the way we do things, our culture, is the normal way of doing things, and when we’re confronted with foreign cultures, especially those that are radically different from our own, it creates tension, and sometimes fear. However, it also challenges us to expand our view of the world and recognize how we’re different from other people, and how we’re the same. We have to allow for the fact that people are going to be different based on where they’re from, and because of these differences they may not see even the simplest aspects of life the same way we do. The tensions in Lewiston are caused by a failure to adequately understand other peoples’ cultures, both on the part of the Somali and the indigenous residents. One example is the mayor sending a letter to the Somali community, written in English, when most of the Somali don’t understand English. On the other hand, you could say that the Somali reaction to the letter was overly violent, because they immediately assumed it was an attack, instead of understanding the local economic situation and thinking of how their intrusion in the local culture has affected the original residents (Belluck, 2002).

These differences between cultures have become much more prominent in the media lately, specifically between what you could call Muslim culture and American culture, due to the United States’ military actions in the Middle East over the last decade. Because of these conflicts, Muslims in general are branded as the enemy. This idea of Muslims being the enemy has been well seated in the United States, and it is with this outlook that the Lewiston residents encountered and came into conflict with the obviously Muslim-influenced culture of the Somali immigrants.

Cultural Differences and Similarities:

Somali Immigrants vs. Lewiston Natives

Beginning to recognize differences between the culture of the Somali immigrants and the native culture of the Lewiston residents would help to shed light on the problem, and perhaps present solutions. The Somali come from a country on the Horn of Africa, which is predominantly Muslim. Many of the elements of their culture are borrowed from nearby Arab countries. Some of their practices may be seen as primitive or strange to Americans, but the culture of the Somali immigrants is simply a result of where they were born.

(Image from: The Two Malcontents)

An important thing to understand about the Somali is that their culture and daily habits are heavily influenced by their religion, Islam, even to the point of their legal system being based on sharia (Islamic) law (Culture of Somalia, 2011). Despite President Obama’s recent announcement that the United States is not a Christian nation, the United States has been heavily influenced by the ideas and morals presented by the Bible. Many of our laws are based on Christian ideas and many of the great changes in our society, such as the end to slavery, were partially argued on the grounds that it violated the religious principles of Christianity (Gilson, 2009). It would be more accurate to say that the United States is a secular nation with Christian values. It’s easy to see how conflicts could arise between a Christian/secularist culture and a culture that is heavily influenced by Islam, especially since most Somalis hold their Muslim beliefs and practices in the highest regard.

The Somali’s adherence to Islam has had a profound effect on their culture. In terms of clothing, most Somali dress in adherence to Islamic principles. Men must wear clothing that covers them from neck to knee, and women must be covered from neck to ankle in non-form-fitting clothing. Married women may additionally wear a head scarf and/or a shawl (Culture of Somalia, 2011). The clothing they wear is sometimes based on region, sometimes adopted from neighboring Arab countries, but is almost always designed for a hot, arid climate and is in compliance with Islamic ideology. Most Somali speak the Somali language, but are illiterate. However, because of the influence of Islam, many Somali can speak and write Arabic, which is the language of the Qur’an. The Somali practice Muslim holidays, such as Ramadan, the month of fasting to celebrate the revelation of the Qur’an; Id al-Fitr; the First of Muharram, when an angel shakes the tree of life and death; Maulid an-Nabi (a celebration of Muhammad’s birth); and Id al-Adha, which commemorates the story of Abraham and his son Ishmael (Shurgin, 2006).

(Photograph by Kevin Fleming/CORBIS)

Other aspects of Somali culture are influenced by the region they come from. In addition to the clothing being adapted to hot, arid climates, the environment has affected their social structure and diet. Many Somali still live off the land as nomads and herders. Their diet consists mainly of cereals and grains, with few vegetables or meats. Due to adherence to Islam, alcohol and pork are not consumed. Milk, tea, coffee and water are the consumed drinks. Due to their nomadic lifestyle, a division of labor based on gender and age has been created, and people tend to live in multi-generational households. They also value interdependence and commonly have large families (Culture of Somalia, 2011).

By comparison, US society is very different. The most commonly recognized and observed holidays are secular or Christian. Individualism is highly valued in society, with children being shooed out the door as soon as possible. Families are typically small, with 2-3 children, rather than the 6+ in Somali families. Alcohol is consumed in great quantities, and a meal is not considered complete without meat, including pork at breakfast. The literacy rate in the US is high due to standardized education and people generally dress according to fashion, rather than a strict religious ideology. One of the greatest differences, though, is the separation of church and state. The Somali culture is incredibly Muslim, and as stated before, even their laws are drawn from their Islamic faith. Despite earlier Christian influences, our government is increasingly enforcing the separation of religion and government from public institutions. Private companies also try to enforce rules against actively promoting or practicing religion in the workplace. This active attempt to remove religion from daily life seems quite natural to Americans, because it’s a principle that the country was founded on. Religion has its place, and US society has determined that place to be outside of public areas. To a Somali Muslim, however, it may be seen as an attack on the Muslim faith, particularly since they require allowances for prayer times throughout the day, as well as facilities for performing ablutions before prayer (Mohammed, 2009). The denial of these facilities for those actions may be seen as a proper separation of church and state, but to a Muslim who is unaware of that cultural trend it may feel targeted.

Despite vast differences in culture, the Somali and the Lewiston residents both have things in common. Both groups have pride in their culture and are trying to do the best they can with the opportunities they’ve been given. Both groups hope for a better future for themselves and their families. Both groups likely value having a peaceful, happy town to live in, where they don’t have to be afraid of physical violence or racially motivated attacks. Both groups are likely hoping for a peaceful resolution that will allow for coexistence. At the time of the writing of Belluck’s article (2002), they also had one more thing in common. They failed to try to understand each other before reacting to the situation they found themselves in.

Accommodation and Cultural Change

Regardless of whether or not it is ‘right’ for the Somali immigrants to settle in Lewiston, or to have been admitted into the United States, it has already happened, and rather than create tension and possibly incite violence, this is an opportunity for these groups to learn about each other and possibly find a common ground to work from. For the residents of Lewiston, the only way for these two groups to come to grips with each other is through dialogue. This dialogue could be opened through town hall meetings. The local government could hold these meetings to address concerns in the town that everyone, including the immigrants, could voice their opinion on. The feeling of working together produced by these meetings would start building a sense of community. Additionally, qualified speakers could be brought in to talk about important cultural aspects of both Somali Muslim and American culture. Another possibility for Lewiston is that they could insert short, commercial-like infomercials into normal commercials that give a brief description of Somali Muslim cultural aspects, like why they wear burkas or why they pray five times a day. In the future, though, steps could be taken by the US government to prevent this type of situation from occurring in the first place.

Robert F. Bukaty / AP

Somali women and children in downtown Lewiston, Me.

When such large and foreign populations are introduced into American society, certain steps could be taken to ensure successful integration. The key to that success is education. It’s hard to predict where large groups of immigrants will attempt to settle, so the best solution for educating locals would be to introduce anthropological and cultural perspectives classes into secondary education as a mandatory requirement on a national level. The United States doesn’t exist alone, and understanding the world around us is beneficial for more reasons than just getting along with potential immigrants. As for the immigrants, mandatory and extended education about American culture, prior to being admitted into the general population, would likely go a long way towards accelerating their assimilation into society, or at the least, help them understand the people they’ll be interacting with. If the Somali immigrants in Lewiston had been taught about the role women play in our society, they wouldn’t have reacted the way they did to female employees (Belluck, 2002). Another helpful accommodation the government could make would be to provide English lessons for refugee immigrants that are admitted to the country. If the government is going to introduce groups of foreigners into US society, it should take responsibility for its actions and make sure these people are well equipped to, at the least, communicate with other Americans on a basic level. It is irresponsible to simply turn them loose in the US and expect them to become successful members of society. These refugee immigrants should also be evaluated for potential job skills, and if none are found, they should be trained. Again, it is irresponsible to simply release these people into American society, where they will invariably wind up living off the welfare system in perpetuity.

There are many things institutions, such as schools, could do to accommodate Muslim Somali immigrants, but the question to be asked is should they? As previously stated, the separation of church and state has rendered the practice of religion in public schools, for example, impossible except for the most private and innocuous of activities, such as praying silently (to yourself) over your meal at lunch time. If these sorts of restrictions have been placed on religion in public institutions, based on a Constitutional Amendment, should we make allowances for immigrant religions just for the sake of appeasement? Should we create a double standard where one religious group is excluded and another is permitted as much freedom as they want? Part of living in the United States is adhering to the local culture, which includes the local laws regulating what is acceptable in public institutions. If that means that religious traditions have to be slightly modified to fit the current situation, then it wouldn’t be the first time it has happened. Rather than ask what the government can do for them, they should ask what they can do for the government. Performing ablutions in a school’s gym showers would be perfectly fine, but allowing Muslim students to miss class time for religious practices would be unfair to the other religious groups that are denied similar privileges, as well as be detrimental to their education, since they would be missing instruction. If an accommodation for Muslims to practice religion in the schools is made, then that same accommodation should be afforded to people of all religions. If that were the case, then the solution would be simple. The school day could be extended by half an hour to 45 minutes, with a period of ‘free time’ beginning at noon. This would allow immigrant Muslim students to go to the gym showers to perform ablutions, conduct prayers in a designated location, and then return to class without missing out on anything. It would give students of other faiths time to have religious meetings, or to hang out with friends, or even to do homework. Another advantage would be that the practice of having a break between classes would start acclimating students to the educational atmosphere present in most colleges. In short, for a religious accommodation in a public institution, such as a school, it should be an ‘all-or-nothing’ policy that includes everyone.

(Photo from ISEDSolutions (Institute For Social And Economic Development))

The experience of the Somali immigrants in Lewiston and the reactions of the locals (noted in Belluck’s article (2002)) illustrate some of the basic concepts of culture and cultural change. We, as individuals, are all products of our social and physical environments, meaning we are all shaped by the culture around us. The way we interpret the world around us depends as much on culture as it does our educations and economic abilities. Because the Somali’s grew up in their Muslim dominated African culture, they had certain expectations of what liberties they should have, what ‘place’ women should be in, and they also had certain expectations of what to believe in terms of ‘white people’. When the mayor of Lewiston presented them with his letter, they immediately assumed they were being put upon by an “ill-informed leader who is bent towards bigotry” (Belluck, 2002). They assumed that because he was white, his intentions toward them were racist, based simply on the color of his skin. In this instance, the mayor’s skin color acted as a “floating signifier” (Jhally, 1997), conferring certain expectations in regards to his behavior, and the behavior of the other white townspeople. The mayor’s letter was made based on the townspeople’s own interpretation of what “them people” (Belluck, 2002) did or did not understand about American culture, economics and the situation of the town. It was an assumption of the Somali’s level of intelligence, based on the fact that they’re from a third world country and have immigrated to the United States. The integration of the Somali immigrants into the Lewiston population also gives us a clear example of acculturation. Based on Belluck’s article (2002), we can see that the Somali immigrants did what most Americans do when confronted with a social problem: they turned to the media to gain attention for their situation and swing popular opinion in their favor. If that isn’t American, nothing is. You could also say that the Somali have adopted the “American Dream”, migrating from place to place within the US to try to find a better life for both themselves and their children, even going so far as to dream of having “a house by the beach one day” (Belluck, 2002).

Conclusion

Culture is a powerful factor that influences our lives in ways that most of us never even begin to guess. It affects our outlook on life and can cause us to come into conflict with people of other cultures due to differences and a lack of education. The Lewiston residents and the Somali immigrants to Lewiston found that out the hard way, by allowing conflict to occur, rather than initiating discussions to learn about each other and overcome differences and challenges as a unified group. These sorts of problems could be greatly alleviated by an aggressive education campaign among American secondary students and incoming refugee immigrants. Additionally, greater freedoms could be allowed to people in institutional settings for the accommodation of religious practices, so long as those practices do not interfere with the actual purpose of the institution and the implemented policies are unilaterally applied. The case of the Somali immigrants in Lewiston serves as a great example of the importance of understanding culture and how it works, or doesn’t work, for us in the real world, as well as showing us the beginnings of cultural acculturation of immigrants. The process of understanding and reaching common ground between groups with such different backgrounds will never be an easy one, but with proper education and respect it will be possible.

References

Migration: A Profile of the US. (2009). Retrieved April 2, 2011, from Pearson: myanthrolab: http://media.pearsoncmg.com/ph/hss/SSA_SHARED_MEDIA_1/anthropology/video/Migration_Profile_of_US.html

Culture of Somalia. (2011, January 18). Retrieved April 3, 2011, from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_of_Somalia

Belluck, P. (2002, October 16). Mixed Welcome as Somalis Settle in a Maine City. Retrieved April 2, 2011, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20021016wednesday.html

Ember, C. R., Ember, M., & Peregrine, P. N. (2010). Anthropology. Prentice Hall.

Gilson, T. (2009, August 12). Christianity and the Abolitionsist Movement. Retrieved April 3, 2011, from Thinking Christian: http://www.thinkingchristian.net/2009/08/christianity-and-the-abolitionist-movement/

Jhally, S. (Director). (1997). Stuart Hall – Race, The Floating Signifier [Motion Picture].

Mohammed, H. (2009, June 3). The Somali Culture and Beliefs. Retrieved April 2, 2011, from The Somali Cultural Association: http://www.somalicultural.org/history/the-somali-culture-and-beliefs

Shurgin, A. H. (2006). Culture of Somalia. Retrieved April 2, 2011, from Countries and Their Cultures: http://www.everyculture.com/Sa-Th/Somalia.html

Townsend, C. (2011, March 30). Class Lecture. New York City, New York, USA.

White, E. B. (1871). Primitive Culture. London: John Murray Publisher.

White, J. J. (May/June 1998). Helping students deal with cultural differences. Social Studies, 107.

A Sad Anchor Baby Story in the Philippines

September 3, 2010 Bradley Farless4 Comments

If you’re not familiar with the anchor baby problem, there’s a part of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution that basically makes it so that any child born on US soil is granted US citizenship. This was put in place to help ensure that the children of former African slaves would be guaranteed US citizenship. Unfortunately, it is now being abused by illegal immigrants who enter the US and ‘drop’ an anchor baby, which can later grow up and bring in the rest of the family legally through regular visa application processes. The problem is mostly with Mexicans, since it’s so easy for them to hop across the mostly unguarded southern border of the US. There are other opportunities and places where foreigners attempt to use babies as an anchor to get into the US though, and I’m going to tell you a story about one such event. This is a story that my wife related to me. I won’t mention any names for the sake of privacy.

An American man was living a happy, regular life in the US with a well paying job, a wife and two kids. Due to the economic downturn he was laid off. Unable to find another job that would maintain the lifestyle he and his family were accustomed to, his wife threw him out of the house and divorced him. Sucks right? So much for “richer or poorer”.

I’m not too clear on the details of how he wound up in the Philippines, but he did, and he got married to a Filipina and had a child with her. She seemed eager to be a good wife, but something just didn’t seem right about her, so he applied for a permanent residency visa in the Philippines and after receiving it told her he wanted to stay indefinitely. He was testing her, and she failed in epic fashion. In an honest relationship, it shouldn’t matter if he wanted to stay here or go back to the US. She should have been satisfied with just being together. That’s what it’s all about right? Instead, she flew into a rage and threw him out into the streets.

Three years further on, this American man is still in the Philippines, working to save up money to allow him to move back to the US at some point and trying to find a way to get custody of his child. He’s still technically married, but has filed for an annulment. Since the wife threw him out of the house, she’s required to pay for it, but she’s stalling. She doesn’t want to go through with it because she wants to use the anchor baby method to try getting into the US.

Luckily, the guy still has some protection from letting this woman carry through with her evil agenda. By birth, the child is American, but only if the father signs off on the paperwork to process it. He won’t do it until she processes the annulment. She won’t process the annulment because it will stop her from using the baby to anchor herself in the US. So, that’s where the problem is. Neither one wants to budge and there’s really no reason why the father should.

Hopefully, at some point the guy will find a way to get the kid back from her and get back into the US with him, leaving the conniving bitch to rot in the Philippines. I’m glad I don’t have this issue.

How I Got a 1 Year Visa For Free in the Philippines

June 25, 2010 Bradley FarlessLeave a comment

When I entered the Philippines on June 1st I entered with a tourist visa stamp with the intention of filing for a resident visa and possibly extensions to hold me over until it was approved. When we went to the Bureau of Immigration satellite office in Makati, however, we were told that filing for a resident visa can take up to 3 months. Extensions might not cut it and it would be costly, so we asked for advice. The lady at the office asked us if we were married and if we’d entered the country together along with a copy of our marriage contract. We said we had, so she asked us why we hadn’t availed of the ‘balikbayan’ privelege.

We had no clue what a balikbayan visa was. We hadn’t seen anything about it on the Bureau of Immigration site while researching visas. It might be there, but since it’s so unusual a phrase, I might have overlooked it. She told us that since my wife had been out of the country for over a year and was an OFW (Overseas Foreign Worker), I, as her spouse, qualified for a 1 year balikbayan visa. She said that we should have approached the immigration counter at NAIA together when we first arrived and I would have received the visa with no problem. Oh, and I’m not sure how this works but the balikbayan visa isn’t actually a visa. I don’t know what you would call it. Also, the best part is that it’s completely free.

Here are the exact requirements to qualify:

Former Philippine citizens (including Filipinos who have become naturalized U.S. citizens, and citizens of the Bahamas, Bermuda and other countries within the jurisdiction of the Embassy of Washington, D.C.); Also eligible are Filipino citizens living overseas. A typical situation is that the Filipino visitor to the Philippines is not yet a foreign citizen, but he or she has an immigration card from a foreign nation [such as a “green card” in the USA].
Foreign spouses and minor foreign unmarried children of Filipinos and former Filipino citizens.

Since we didn’t get the visa at the airport, we had to take a few extra steps. We wound up having to make a trip to the main office of the Bureau of Immigration in Intramuros, an area of Manila that used to be home to the Spaniards during the colonial period. Once there we approached the information desk and stated our case. The clerk at the desk told us to proceed to the Immigration Regulation division on the 3rd floor where we again stated our case to the Immigration Officer who helped us.

Since we didn’t follow the steps appropriately, it was within the discretion of the Immigration Officer to tell us to leave the country and then return to get the balikbayan visa, but we were polite and had our documents ready so she was more than happy to help us out. She had us fill out a form requesting the change and then made a notation on my passport visa page, amending the tourist 21 day visa stamp to a balikbayan visa.

So, now I can stay in the Philippines for up to 1 year at no charge, which gives me more than ample time to apply for the resident visa at my convenience. Living in the Philippines comes with a cascading torrent of fees, but for once the system worked in our favor without costing us a few thousand pesos.

If you’re planning on coming to the Philippines and you qualify for this, save yourself some time and get it done right at the airport. Just remember that you have to arrive together, approach the desk together, have your passports (obviously) and your valid marriage contract. If however, you’re already here and didn’t know about this, hopefully this post will give you an idea of how to get it amended.

Good luck!